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Psychology, The Ohio State University at Newark, Newark, OH, USA
Recent research has identified a number of factors that can influence performance
on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) when it is used in clinical or research settings. The
current studies examine the effects of construal level theory (CLT) on the IGT. Study 1
suggests that when primed with a high construal mindset (i.e., thinking abstractly vs.
concretely), individuals learned to avoid Deck A more than those primed with a low
construal mindset. Study 2 suggests that when construal level is manipulated through
psychological distance (i.e., selecting for a close vs. distant friend), individuals in a high
construal mindset instead showed a preference for Deck A compared to individuals in a
low construal mindset or a control group. Taken together, these studies suggest that IGT
performance is impacted by the manner in which one construes the task. Implications
for decision making research and use of the IGT as a clinical and research instrument are
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
People make decisions daily, from seemingly mundane choices like what to wear to major life
decisions like who to marry or what career path to take. Whether mundane or life-changing, the
decisions we make define who we were, who we are, and who we will be. Individuals who choose
advantageously reap the benefits of those decisions, while those that choose disadvantageously
are often left wondering how they arrived at their current state. Many measures exist that
assess different types of decision making, some of which also purport to predict who will decide
advantageously and who will decide disadvantageously. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara
et al., 1994) is widely used by clinicians and researchers alike, and examines both advantageous and
disadvantageous selections under ambiguity and risk.
Recent research has called into question the utility of using the IGT in isolation as a clinical
measure of decision making, as significant fluctuations in performance occur in a healthy control
populations and the precise decision making measured by the task is still debated (for review, see
Steingroever et al., 2013). Prior research has highlighted how contextual factors such as negative
mood and extra learning trials can improve performance on the IGT (Buelow et al., 2013, 2014),
while the anticipation of a public speaking task can decrease performance on the IGT (Preston et al.,
2007) suggesting that contextual factors could mask or otherwise interfere with the assessment of
the individual’s actual (baseline) decision making ability. Additionally, the IGT scoring criteria can
affect interpretation of selections on the task (see below for additional detail). Taken together, these
contextual and scoring factors can affect performance on behavioral measures of decision making.
Moreover, multiple studies have shown few significant correlations between performance on the
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IGT and performance on other behavioral decision making
and problem solving tasks (Lejuez et al., 2003; Overman
et al., 2004; Aklin et al., 2005; Skeel et al., 2007; Buelow
and Blaine, 2015), leading to questions regarding whether the
task is sensitive to only decision making impairments. The
IGT (Bechara, 2007) is used by clinicians to assess risk-taking
behavior and decision making. Understanding the different
contextual factors that could influence performance on this
task will help guide the improvement of the clinical assessment
of decision making. Given this, the present set of studies
sought to examine whether the manner in which the task is
construed (abstractly or concretely) might affect outcomes on
the IGT.
THE IOWA GAMBLING TASK AS A
CLINICAL MEASURE OF DECISION
MAKING
The IGT is one of the most widely cited behavioral decision
making tasks in the literature and has been adapted into a
clinical assessment instrument (Bechara, 2007) based on the
Bechara et al. (2001) test revision. The task was initially designed
to assess decision making impairments in individuals with
ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage who showed real-world
decision making failures but scored within the normal range on
formal measures of executive functioning (Bechara et al., 1994).
Although originally designed for individuals with focal lesions,
research has shown the IGT is sensitive to impairments due
to head injury, amygdala damage, bipolar disorder, obsessive
compulsive disorder, pathological gambling, substance abuse
and dependence, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(see Buelow and Suhr, 2009, for discussion). Typically, poor
performance on the IGT (i.e., choosing disadvantageously) is
associated with the presence of these and other neurological or
psychological diagnoses.
On the IGT, participants are given a loan of $2000 and told
to maximize profit over 100 trials by selecting from one of
four decks of cards: A, B, C, or D. On each trial, participants
always experience a win but sometimes also experience a loss.
With some decks, those losses can outweigh the benefits of the
immediate reward. Decks A and B have an average profit of $100
per selection and Decks C and D have an average profit of $50
per selection (Bechara, 2007). After 10 selections from Decks
A or B, individuals have incurred a net loss of $250; however,
after 10 selections from Decks C or D, individuals instead have
earned a net gain of $250 (Bechara, 2007). From these differences
in long-term outcomes, Decks A and B have been considered
“disadvantageous” and Decks C and D “advantageous” (Bechara,
2007). Differences exist between Decks A and B and Decks C
and D, based on the frequency of losses. Selections from Decks A
and C experience losses on 50% of trials, whereas selections from
Decks B and D experience losses on only 10% of trials (Bechara,
2007). These differences in frequency of losses may explain why
a significant subset of “healthy control” participants exhibit a
preference for Deck B, with high immediate rewards, a low
frequency of losses, but long-term negative outcomes (Toplak
et al., 2005; Caroselli et al., 2006; Fernie and Tunney, 2006;
Buelow et al., 2013).
The IGT creators put forth that the task was sensitive to
affective decision making (i.e., gut feelings and intuition; Bechara
et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994; Seguin et al., 2007). Research supports
this idea, indicating that individuals develop somatic markers
in response to disadvantageous selections on the task that help
guide performance (Bechara et al., 1996, 1997; Crone et al., 2004).
However, recent research on the somatic marker hypothesis is
mixed (Dunn et al., 2006), with some research suggesting that
the IGT assesses both affective and deliberative decision making
at different points in the task (Maia and McClelland, 2004;
Brand et al., 2007; Guillaume et al., 2009; Schiebener et al.,
2011). Although the precise decision making processes involved
on the task are still being understood, most researchers agree
early trials assess affective decision making while later trials
assess deliberative decision making (Dunn et al., 2006; Wood
and Bechara, 2014; Buelow and Blaine, 2015). To help further
differentiate these two sets of trials, Brand et al. (2007) found that
decision making during the early trials (“decision making under
ambiguity”) is guided by gut feelings and instincts, while during
the later trials (“decision making under risk”) participants have
learned enough about the decks to estimate the relative risks and
benefits of each. Supporting this distinction is the failure of the
IGT to consistently correlate with other affective decisionmaking
tasks such as the Columbia Card Task-hot (CCT-hot; Figner and
Voelki, 2004) and the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART; Lejuez
et al., 2002), suggesting that it measures a unique type of decision
making not assessed in other decision making tasks. When factor
analyzed, the IGT held as a unique factor in a model with the
BART and CCT (Buelow and Blaine, 2015).
Despite the IGT’s wide use in research and clinical practice,
recent research has called into question its use as a stand-alone
tool for investigating clinical decision making. Some have argued
that the IGT can be influenced by different factors, including
age (Blair et al., 2001; Crone and van der Molen, 2004; Kerr
and Zelazo, 2004; Denburg et al., 2006; Fein et al., 2007; Garon
and Moore, 2007), gender (Reavis and Overman, 2001; Bolla
et al., 2005; Davis et al., 2007; Goudriaan et al., 2007; Businelle
et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2013), personality (Addison
and Schmidt, 1999; van Honk et al., 2002; Crone et al., 2003;
Franken and Muris, 2005; Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007; Buelow and
Suhr, 2013), extra learning trials (Buelow et al., 2013, 2014; Lin
et al., 2013), and mood (Must et al., 2006; Suhr and Tsanadis,
2007; Buelow et al., 2013). It is important to acknowledge that
contextual factors likely affect many clinical measures. However,
the effects of contextual factors become paramount when a lack
of agreement exists on what a specific instrument, such as the
IGT, is truly measuring. Understanding what and how contextual
factors affect performance is an important way to gain knowledge
of the test’s ability to measure what it was designed to measure.
To fully understand an individual’s decision making processes,
assessment of the construct should be minimally sensitive to
contextual factors. Although some of these factors may be more
consistent across time (i.e., gender, personality) than others (i.e.,
age, mood), some factors (i.e., extra trials) are products of the
testing situation. It is possible that the individual’s mindset—not
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just current mood—may affect testing performance on the IGT.
Despite these known limitations of the IGT and inconsistencies
in how it is scored, it has been put forth as a clinical assessment
instrument; however, no other behavioral decision making tasks
have been adapted for clinical use alongside the IGT. It is
important, then, to understand the different factors that influence
performance on this task.
IGT AND CONSTRUAL LEVEL
As previously stated, the IGT can be broken down into
disadvantageous (Decks A and B) and advantageous (Decks C
and D) deck choices (Bechara et al., 1994), with advantageous
decision making dependent on consideration of long-term rather
than short-term outcomes (as the authors originally intended).
However, this masks differences in the frequency of wins and
losses between Decks A and B and between Decks C and D.
Although Decks A and B have similar long-term outcomes,
selecting from Deck A results in losses on 50% of trials whereas
Deck B experiences losses on only 10% of trials (Bechara, 2007).
The magnitude of losses is therefore greater with Deck B than
Deck A. A similar pattern emerges for Decks C (50% losses)
and D (10% losses, greater magnitude of losses). Thus, when
selections from each deck are analyzed independently, the IGT
can also be conceptualized as a choice between high and low
frequency of wins and losses (Caroselli et al., 2006; Lin et al.,
2007, 2009; Chiu et al., 2008). Due to these differing foci of
attention (long-term outcomes vs. frequency of losses), the IGT
manual now refers to selections from Deck B as a non-optimal
decision making strategy but continued selection from Deck A as
indicative of pathological decision making (Bechara, 2007). Not
examining the individual deck selections separately may result
in someone who chooses from Deck B, to minimize frequency
of losses, labeled as just as disadvantageous a decision maker
as someone who continually selects from Deck A despite the
negative outcomes. One contextual factor that has not been
investigated with the IGT, but that may affect outcomes on
individual deck selections, is the manner in which individuals
construe the task.
Individuals often imagine future situations in both the near
and distant future. For example, an individual may imagine
what their life might be like next week or in 5 years.
Considerable research suggests that the process by which an
individual mentally imagines near and distant future events
differs leading to variable outcomes in such domains as category
breadth (Liberman et al., 2002, study 1), dimensionality of
future representations (Liberman et al., 2002, study 2), and
optimism (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Construal level theory
(CLT; Trope and Liberman, 2003, 2010) suggests that when
individuals imagine future events, they create abstract mental
representations that vary to the extent that the imagined future is
near or distant. Thus, CLT suggests that individuals can construe
future events abstractly (high level construal) or concretely
(low level construal). Research indicates that individuals will
construe near future events using a low level construal and
distant future events using a higher-level construal (Trope and
Liberman, 2010). Moreover, CLT suggests that the use of a high
level construal increases with psychological distance (Semin and
Fiedler, 1991; Fujita et al., 2006a). Construal level differences
have also been shown using other types of psychological distance,
such as temporal and social distance (Liberman et al., 2007).
For example, Fujita et al. (2006a) had participants watch a video
of two students interacting and were informed the students
were physically near or physically distant from the participant.
Participants then provided a written description of the activity
in the video. Results indicated descriptions for those in the
physically distant condition contained more abstract language
compared to those in the physically near condition, suggesting
that participants construed the activity in the video with greater
abstraction when they believed the location was distal rather than
proximal.
Applied to the IGT, imagining that one is earning money
for a distant acquaintance (high level construal) should lead
to advantageous decision making while imagining earning
money for a close friend (low level construal) should lead to
disadvantageous decision making. Although the task directions
do not indicate the individual should imagine earning money
for a close friend, it is possible that recent knowledge of a
friend’s financial hardships could weigh on the individual’s mind,
in turn affecting performance on the IGT. Alternatively, if one
actively engaged in abstract thought prior to taking the IGT, that
construal process could transfer to the IGT affecting outcomes
(see Smith and Branscombe, 1988; Gollwitzer and Kinney, 1989;
Förster et al., 2004; for examples using non-IGT tasks).
CLT also posits that when individuals are in a high construal
mindset they are more likely to rely on their internal values
compared to when they are in a low construal mindset
(Sagristano et al., unpublished manuscript). For example, when
students are informed that a potential class is temporally
distant (e.g., will take place in 1 year) they are more likely
to focus on whether or not the professor treats students
with respect. However, when students believe that a potential
class is temporally close (e.g., will start in few days) they are
more likely to focus on things such as the professor’s typical
grade distribution (Kivetz and Tyler, 2007; Torelli and Kaikati,
2009). Moreover, individuals are more likely to endorse attitude
consistent behavior when they are imagining the behaviors in the
distant rather than near future (Fujita et al., 2006b; Sagristano
et al., unpublished manuscript). Thus, decisions made in the
future are more likely to be guided by and reflect one’s internal
values and desires while decisions made in the present are more
likely to reflect specific features of the decision (e.g., contextual
and situational factors).
Given the extent to which different construal mindsets can
affect the processing of information, it stands to reason that
these psychological states may affect performance on decision
making tasks in which differences in long-term vs. short-term
outcomes are present, such as the IGT (e.g., Buelow et al., 2013),
the Delay Discounting Task (e.g., Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995;
Bickel et al., 1999; Kirby et al., 1999, 2005), and the BART (e.g.,
Acheson et al., 2007; Benjamin and Robbins, 2007; Lejuez et al.,
2002). That is, individuals in a high construal mindset should be
more likely to act in accordance with their internal preferences
and values, leading to more advantageous choices on decision
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making tasks when the goal of the task is congruent with a
focus on long-term outcomes (e.g., winning more money on the
IGT). More importantly, those in a high construal state of mind
are more likely to focus on abstractions (rather than specifics)
leading to more advantageous decision making on the IGT and
other tasks in which short- and long-term outcomes are available.
That is, individuals in a high construal mindset are likely to
ignore concrete and specific aspects of the decision making task
and focus instead on core and stable elements of the task. In
relation to the IGT, individuals in a high construal mindset
may ignore the immediate consequence of their actions (e.g.,
large win vs. large loss) and instead focus on the more abstract
goal-congruent long-term consequences (e.g., earnmoremoney).
One could also consider that decision making on tasks such as
the IGT requires that one parse several pieces of information
to learn to choose advantageously on the task. During the
IGT, individuals are presented with win vs. loss information,
but also large vs. small immediate outcomes. The ability of
individuals to choose advantageously on the task requires that
they ignore some information (large immediate rewards that
lead to less money overall—favorable short-term outcomes)
in favor of other information (small immediate rewards that
lead to more money overall—favorable long-term outcomes).
The ability to ignore irrelevant information to engage in goal-
directed behavior should be enhanced when one is in a high
(vs. low) construal mindset. Previous research has suggested
that individuals in a high construal mindset focus more on
attaining goals, whereas individuals in a low construal mindset
focus more on avoiding losses (Pennington and Roese, 2003;
Förster and Higgins, 2005; Lee et al., 2010). In addition, high
construal level is associated with a focus on the “pros” or
the positives of a given decision (Eyal et al., 2004), indicating
participants in this mindset may begin to show a preference
for the advantageous decks as information is learned and the
task progresses. In a recent study, Lermer et al. (2015) found
greater risk-taking on the BART among individuals in a high-
construal mindset; however, no learning of risks and benefits
associated with decisions occurs on the BART compared to
the IGT.
THE PRESENT STUDIES
The present studies examined whether the manner in which
you construe the task affects performance on the IGT. Previous
research has shown that some contextual variables can affect
performance, and it is possible that the mindset one is in during
testing—high vs. low construal—can also affect performance.
We believe that construal mindset serves as an attribute of the
decision making process. Understanding all of the mechanisms
negatively affecting IGT performance is important as the IGT
is frequently used by researchers and clinicians alike. Across
two studies, participants were primed with a high- or low-
level construal procedural task, or received no prime, and then
completed the IGT. We predicted that those primed with a
high construal mindset would choose more advantageously on




Participants were 90 undergraduate students (58 females) at
a regional campus of a large Midwestern university, ages 18–
33 (M = 19.00, SD = 2.30), who were enrolled in
General Psychology courses. Most (67.4%) self-identified as
Caucasian.
Measures
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
In the present study, the IGT version available through PAR,
Inc. was utilized (Bechara, 2007). This version of the IGT is
based on the revised task described in Bechara et al. (2001).
The task has been validated in various patient and non-patient
samples (see Buelow and Suhr, 2009, for a review). Based on
the scoring issues outlined previously and the confounding of
long-term outcomes and frequency of losses on the decks, the
percent selections from each individual deck (A,B,C,D) during
decision making under ambiguity (Trials 1–40) and decision
making under risk (Trials 41–100; Brand et al., 2007) were
calculated.
Procedure
The present study was approved by the University’s Institutional
Review Board. Following informed consent, participants
were randomly assigned to complete a construal level
manipulation utilizing procedural mindset priming—the
categories vs. exemplars task (Fujita et al., 2006b). In this
task, participants are provided with 40 stimulus words and
asked to repeatedly engage in high- or low-level construal
processing by generating a superordinate category label (high
construal; n = 30 participants) or subordinate exemplar
(low construal; n = 30 participants) for each such that the
induced mindset transfers to a subsequent task (see Smith
and Branscombe, 1988; Gollwitzer and Kinney, 1989; Förster
et al., 2004; for examples). For example, those induced into
a low construal mindset might be given the word “soda” and
provide “Coke” as their response, while those induced to a high
construal mindset may provide “beverage” as their response.
Immediately following this manipulation, participants completed
the IGT.
An additional 30 participants made up a control group who
did not complete a construal manipulation. These participants
were compiled from a separate study conducted concurrently
to the present study, in which participants did not receive a
manipulation prior to the IGT (Bevelhymer-Rangel and Buelow,
2014).
Data Analysis
Data were first examined for between-groups differences
in demographic variables. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were
conducted on the IGT deck selections, with study condition
(high construal, low construal, control) as the between-subjects
variable and block (Block 1: Trials 1–40; Block 2: Trials 41–100)
as the repeated-measures variable.
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STUDY 1 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
There was not a significant difference between the three groups




3.01, p = 0.22. For Deck A, there was a significant main effect
of block, F(1, 87) = 47.96, p < 0.001, in that participants selected
more fromDeck A in Block 1 than Block 2 (seeTable 1 formeans,
standard deviations, and effect sizes). Thus, learning occurred on
the IGT, as participants shifted their decisions away from the
most disadvantageous deck. There was also a significant main
effect of group, F(2, 87) = 3.63, p = 0.03. Participants in the
Low Construal group selected significantly more from Deck A
than participants in the High Construal group, p = 0.01. In
addition, the control group selected marginally more from Deck
A than participants in the High Construal group, p = 0.067.
The interaction was not significant for Deck A, F(2, 87) = 0.13,
p = 0.88.
For Deck B, none of the main [Block: F(1, 87) = 0.82, p = 0.37;
Group: F(2, 87) = 0.99, p = 0.38] or interaction, F(2, 87) = 0.02,
p = 0.98, effects were significant. Similarly, none of the main
[Block: F(1, 87) = 1.21, p = 0.28; Group: F(2, 87) = 0.04,
p = 0.96] or interaction, F(2, 87) = 0.16, p = 0.85, effects were
significant for Deck C.
Finally, for Deck D, the main effect of Block was significant,
F(1, 87) = 12.24, p = 0.001. Participants selected significantly
more from Deck D during Block 2 than Block 1, p = 0.001.
Neither the main effect of group, F(2, 87) = 0.06, p = 0.94, or
the interaction effect, F(2, 87) = 0.04, p = 0.96, were significant.
TABLE 1 | Study 1Variables Presented as Mean (standard deviation).
Variable Block 1 Block 2 η2 B η2 G η2 B×G
Deck A 0.355 0.077 0.003
High 18.33 (6.27) 12.06 (6.23)
Low 21.50 (5.82) 15.67 (8.44)
Control 21.08 (5.90) 14.11 (6.83)
Deck B 0.009 0.022 0.001
High 36.00 (10.96) 34.61 (20.92)
Low 33.75 (8.45) 31.50 (14.53)
Control 32.00 (8.47) 30.56 (18.05)
Deck C 0.041 0.001 0.004
High 21.42 (6.84) 22.33 (11.22)
Low 20.83 (5.74) 23.61 (13.63)
Control 21.92 (6.78) 23.05 (15.37)
Deck D 0.123 0.001 0.001
High 24.25 (10.69) 31.00 (18.30)
Low 23.92 (8.03) 29.72 (13.35)
Control 24.92 (8.89) 30.48 (17.29)
B, Block; G, Group; B×G, Block×Group Interaction; Deck, percent selections fromDecks
A, B, C, and D on Block 1 (Trials 1–40) and Block 2 (Trials 41–100).
Taken together, the present results indicate no significant
interaction between group and IGT block; however, significant
main effects emerged on Decks A and D. Specifically, learning
occurred on the task: participants, independent of group,
learned to avoid Deck A and select from Deck D as the task
progressed. These results are consistent with previous research
showing the IGT does not solely rely on affective decision
making processes, and instead learning can occur (Maia and
McClelland, 2004; Dunn et al., 2006; Brand et al., 2007; Guillaume
et al., 2009; Schiebener et al., 2011; Wood and Bechara, 2014;
Buelow and Blaine, 2015). A significant main effect of construal
level group emerged on Deck A, in that participants primed
with a low construal mindset selected significantly more from
Deck A (independent of block) than participants in a high
construal mindset. In addition, the high construal group selected
marginally less from Deck A than the control group. The results
of Study 1 provide initial evidence that a high-level construal
mindset can lead to a more advantageous decision making
strategy on the IGT, in that participants learned to avoid Deck
A—a deck associated with more pathological decision making
(Bechara, 2007). However, to ensure that a high-level construal
mindset led to changes in decisionmaking strategy, we decided to
replicate Study 1 using a different type of construal manipulation
in which participants were asked to earn money on the IGT for a
mere acquaintance (high-level construal) or a close friend (low-
level construal). In a recent study, Kim et al. (2013) found that
the greater the perceived psychological distance from a person,
the more advantageous decisions were made. In the present
study, it was hypothesized that participants in the high construal
condition would again select more advantageously than those in
the low construal condition.
STUDY 2 METHOD
Participants
Participants were 90 undergraduate students (44 females) at a
regional campus of a large Midwestern University who were
18–34 years old (M = 18.92, SD = 1.99) and were enrolled
in General Psychology courses. Most (72.4%) self-identified as
Caucasian.
Measures
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
The standard computerized IGT was again utilized (Bechara,
2007). The percent selections from each individual deck during
early (Trials 1–40) and later (Trials 41–100) trials were calculated.
Procedure
The present study was approved by the University’s Institutional
Review Board. Following informed consent, participants were
randomly assigned to complete a different construal level
manipulation than in Study 2. This construal manipulation
involved manipulating psychological distance rather than
procedural mindset (Kim et al., 2013). Participants were either
asked to think of someone very close to them—a close friend or
family member (low construal; n = 30 participants)—or to think
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of someone not very close to them—a mere acquaintance (high
construal; n = 30 participants). Participants in both groups were
then asked to make decisions on the IGT as if they were earning
money for that individual instead of themselves.
An additional 30 participants made up a control group who
did not complete a construal manipulation. These participants
were compiled from a separate study conducted concurrently
to the present study, in which participants did not receive a
manipulation prior to the IGT, and were distinct from the control
group utilized in Study 1 (Bevelhymer-Rangel and Buelow, 2014).
Data Analysis
Data were first examined for between-groups differences
in demographic variables. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were
conducted on the IGT deck selections, with study condition
(high construal, low construal, control) as the between-subjects
variable and block (Block 1: Trials 1–40; Block 2: Trials 41–100)
as the repeated-measures variable.
STUDY 2 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS




= 5.05, p = 0.08. There was, however, a significant
difference in age, F(2, 85) = 3.33, p = 0.04. The control group
(M = 18.18, SD = 0.48) was significantly younger than the high
construal group (M = 19.47, SD = 2.93), p = 0.04. Due to
this age difference, correlations were calculated between age and
IGT performance. Age was significantly correlated with Block
1 selections for Deck C, r(86) = 0.26, p = 0.02, and Deck D,
r(86) = −0.23, p = 0.03, only. Given this minimal relationship
between age and performance on the IGT and our small sample
size, we elected not to include age as a covariate in the remaining
analyses.
For Deck A, there was a significant main effect of Block,
F(1, 87) = 36.15, p < 0.001, in that participants selected more
from Deck A in Block 1 than Block 2, p < 0.001, independent
of group (see Table 2 for means, standard deviations, and effect
sizes). The group effect was marginal, F(2, 87) = 2.91, p = 0.06,
in that participants in the high construal group selected more
from Deck A than participants in the control (p = 0.025) or low
construal (p = 0.073) groups. There was also a significant block
by group interaction, F(2, 87) = 6.94, p = 0.002. Participants
in the control group selected significantly more from Deck A
in Block 1 than Block 2, p < 0.001. In addition, participants in
the low construal group selected significantly more from Deck A
in Block 1 than Block 2, p < 0.001. There was no difference in
selections across blocks for the high construal group, p = 0.59.
For Deck B, neither of the main effects were significant
[Block: F(1, 87) = 0.38, p = 0.54; Group: F(2, 87) = 0.70,
p = 0.50]. In addition, the interaction effect was not significant,
F(2, 87) = 2.51, p = 0.09. For Deck C, again neither of
the main effects were significant [Block: F(1, 87) = 0.02, p =
0.90; Group: F(2, 87) = 0.77, p = 0.47]. The block by group
interaction was also not significant for Deck C, F(2, 87) = 1.27,
p = 0.29.
For Deck D, the main effect of block was significant, F(1, 87) =
17.30, p < 0.001, in that participants selected more from Deck
TABLE 2 | Study 2 variables presented as mean (standard deviation).
Variable Block 1 Block 2 η2 B η2 G η2 B×G
Deck A 0.294 0.063 0.138
High 21.33 (8.25) 20.11 (14.00)
Low 24.00 (9.25) 11.39 (7.00)
Control 21.58 (5.51) 12.22 (6.73)
Deck B 0.004 0.016 0.054
High 32.83 (16.88) 27.44 (13.6)
Low 31.00 (10.48) 28.67 (18.45)
Control 31.08 (9.46) 35.44 (19.06)
Deck C >0.001 0.017 0.028
High 23.25 (13.54) 22.22 (10.56)
Low 22.00 (7.38) 24.94 (20.37)
Control 21.50 (4.76) 19.06 (12.21)
Deck D 0.166 0.012 0.011
High 22.58 (11.79) 30.28 (18.53)
Low 23.00 (8.74) 35.00 (19.82)
Control 25.83 (9.54) 33.28 (22.73)
B, Block; G, Group; B×G, Block×Group Interaction; Deck, percent selections fromDecks
A, B, C, and D on Block 1 (Trials 1–40) and Block 2 (Trials 41–100).
D in Block 2 than Block 1. The main effect of group was not
significant, F(2, 87) = 0.54, p = 0.58. The block by group
interaction was also not significant, F(2, 87) = 0.46, p = 0.63.
Counter to our hypothesis, individuals who were told to
imagine earning money for a psychologically close other (low
construal) learned to avoid Deck A on the IGT compared to
those that imagined earning money for a psychologically distant
other (high construal). Thus, participants in a high construal
mindset selected from the riskiest deck, even more so than those
who did not complete a construal priming task. Both the control
group and the low construal group significantly decreased their
selections from Deck A as the task progressed. In a series of three
studies, Beisswanger et al. (2003) found that participants made
riskier decisions for their friends than for themselves; however,
this difference disappeared when the likelihood of significant
negative outcomes increased. As applied to the IGT, it is possible
that our participants felt that the potential for loss when making
decisions for a close friend outweighed the potential for loss
when making decisions for a distant friend, leading to improved
decision making on the task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
While research is still being conducted on the task, clinicians are
increasingly using the IGT to clinically evaluate decision making.
Although the IGT manual (Bechara, 2007) indicates that the
task can be used in this manner, recent research suggests that
using the task as a sole determinant of decision making ability
may not be an accurate measure of one’s decision making ability
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(for review, see Steingroever et al., 2013). The purpose of this
set of studies was to investigate whether the manner in which
individuals construe the task affects IGT performance.
Across two studies, manipulating the manner in which
individuals construed the task differentially affected outcomes on
the IGT. When using procedural mindset priming to manipulate
the manner in which individuals construed the IGT (Study 1),
individuals in a high-level construal mindset learned to avoid
Deck A, the deck associated with pathological decision making
(Bechara, 2007). Conversely, when manipulating psychological
distance to manipulate construal level (Study 2), individuals in
a high construal mindset failed to learn to avoid Deck A. Instead,
individuals in a low construal mindset and control participants
learned to avoid Deck A as the task progressed. Thus, the
manipulations produced results in opposition to one another,
suggesting the two may affect scores on the IGT using separate
psychological mechanisms.
There are several reasons why procedural mindset priming
might operate differently on the IGT compared to amanipulation
involving psychological distance. Both manipulations attempt to
illicit an abstract or concrete mindset, but do so in fundamentally
different ways. Procedural mindset priming hinges on the
assumption that repeatedly engaging in a particular type of
processing style (e.g., high construal) primes that mindset,
making it more likely for that processing style to transfer to
an immediately subsequent task. Like most priming effects,
its effectiveness is likely short-lived and dependent upon the
contiguity of the first and second tasks (see Van den Bussche
et al., 2009, for discussion of priming effects). To this end,
construal level procedural mindset priming effects should be
strongest early in the subsequent task and should fade as that task
progresses. It is possible that with administration of additional
trials, which has been shown to improve performance on the
IGT (Buelow et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2013), the effects of construal
level priming may dissipate and exert less of an influence on task
performance.
In both studies, significant effects emerged on Decks A
and D only, which may be attributed to individual deck-level
differences. Deck D is widely regarded as the “best” or most
advantageous deck, as continued selections from it result in
long-term gains and a lower frequency (10%) of losses (Bechara,
2007). Deck C, although considered an advantageous deck,
produces losses on 50% of trials. Although in the long term the
wins outweigh the losses from this deck, individuals who are
attuned to loss frequency may avoid this deck and deem it a
disadvantageous deck. Previous research has shown a prominent
Deck B preference among healthy control participants (e.g.,
Toplak et al., 2005; Caroselli et al., 2006; Fernie and Tunney,
2006), and it appears that this effect is driven by a preference
for high immediate gains (in comparison to the lower immediate
gains of Deck D) and the low frequency of immediate losses.
Thus, for a significant subset of healthy controls, Deck B can
be seen as an advantageous deck. It is possible that our lack of
findings with Decks B and C are due in part to these confounds
in how the decks are appraised by participants. Deck A selections
are indicative of pathological decision making (Bechara, 2007),
and continued selections from this deck are not typically seen in
control participants. It is then possible the outcomes for Deck
A in the present studies are the result of faster detection of the
disadvantages of Deck A due to the manner in which participants
construed the task. It is also possible that characteristics of
our sample led to these deck-specific results. College student
participants may exhibit the prominent Deck B phenomenon, as
has been shown in some of the previous research (e.g., Caroselli
et al., 2006). In addition, students may have multiple friends
or family members experiencing financial strain—or may be
experiencing this strain themselves—thus leading to a greater
emotional investment in decisionsmade for close friends in Study
2. We also had more females than males in Study 1, and gender
may have played a role in deck selections (e.g., Bolla et al., 2005;
Davis et al., 2007; Businelle et al., 2008).
Across two studies, we have provided evidence that construal
level can impact performance on the IGT. Specifically, increasing
psychological distance may lead to continued selections from
a disadvantageous deck, while priming individuals with a high
construal mindset may lead to decreased selections from this
same disadvantageous deck. It is possible that during a clinical
evaluation, individuals engaging in high construal level thinking
(planning for their retirement) prior to taking the IGT may
likely make more advantageous decisions than those engaging in
low construal level thinking prompted by psychological distance
(imagining a close other), or even compared to their own
decisions when not engaging in high construal level thinking.
Additionally, during a clinical evaluation with the IGT, a
participant may be thinking about their own recent financial
difficulties, or those of a close friend or family member. Each
of these processes is likely to impact performance on the IGT
and, more importantly, the clinical evaluation of decisionmaking
impairment. In addition, these same contextual factors can
negatively affect assessment of decision making in a lab-based
setting. The IGT is still frequently used as a behavioral measure
of risky decision making, and without taking contextual factors
such as construal level into account, ensuring understanding of
what the IGT is assessing is difficult. However, it is important
to note that construal level is not the only factor affecting IGT
performance, as it is likely that other factors (such as age, gender,
personality, and other to-date unknown factors) can also affect
performance on this task in the clinic and in the lab.
The results between the present studies were contradictory.
Thus, while these differences may be accounted for by the type
of manipulation used, the results should be interpreted with
caution until further research can identify the exact psychological
mechanism responsible for those differences or appropriate
moderators can be identified. Previous research has shown that
emotional state can affect decision making (Forgas, 1995), with
both positive (Nygren et al., 1996; Roiser et al., 2009) and
negative (Heilman et al., 2010; Buelow et al., 2013)mood affecting
performance on the IGT. Within the moral decision making
field, personal dilemmas elicit greater emotional response than
impersonal or non-moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001; Skoe
et al., 2002; Myyry and Helkama, 2007), which in turn affects
decision making. It is possible that in Study 2, participants
who were asked to decide for a close friend increased their
emotional involvement and engagement on the IGT. As the
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IGT is thought to be based, at least in part, on emotion-
based decision making, it is possible that this activation of
an emotional experience increased decision making whereas
making decisions for a distant acquaintance could have resulted
in limited emotional input during the task. Additionally, our
data were culturally homogenous and cannot account for the
impact that culture may have on our findings. Individuals from
different cultural backgrounds may interpret the construal tasks
differently, in turn changing their assumed effects on cognitive
processes.
Taken together, our findings suggest that priming participants
with a high or low construal mindset affects advantageous
and disadvantageous decision making on the IGT. Across
multiple studies, personality, mood, and other contextual factors
have been shown to affect performance on the IGT, a task
designed to assess real-world decision making impairments
among individuals with damage to the prefrontal cortex.
Disadvantageous decision making is not specific to such damage,
nor to a specific neurological or psychological diagnosis. It is
important for clinicians to account for the presence of such
contextual and other factors before determining a patient’s
decision making ability when using the IGT in isolation. Using
the IGT as part of a multi-faceted approach to assessing decision
making that includes the use of multiple decision making tasks
should help increase the validity of the assessment, as contextual
effects on any one task should be minimized when results
are congruent across measures. However, to truly conduct a
valid assessment of decision making utilizing multiple measures,
additional measures validated for use in clinical populations are
needed. This multi-faceted approach would then allow for a
broader, and more accurate, understanding of decision making
that is less resistant to contextual and other factors. Researchers
investigating what the IGT is truly measuring should also be
cognizant of contextual factors as they may affect outcomes
on the IGT, leading to null relationships between it and other
decision making tasks. Ultimately, clinical research informs
clinical practice. Thus, a thorough understanding of the task
and the factors that affect performance from lab-based settings
is warranted prior to using the IGT as a stand-alone measure of
decision making in clinical evaluations.
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